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ABSTRACT

Part of a series of studies on higher education in different countries, this paper examines the organization of higher education in Denmark, the growth of the system, the nature of the parliamentary legislation of the 1970's, and the Danish system from the standpoint of institution-building. There are three state-supported sectors of higher education. The first sector contains faculties of medicine, theology, natural sciences, arts, and social sciences (including law). The second sector involves technical and other specialized disciplines; the third, teacher training colleges, library schools, and social work schools. There has been a rapid growth in students over the last two decades and a corresponding increase in the number of teachers. Institution-building in Denmark has involved two distinct processes: (1) reshaping of the existing or pre-1970 universities at Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Odense, and later of other institutions of higher education (e.g. Danish Technical University); and (2) the building of two totally new university centers at Roskilde and Aalborg. The organizational change in Denmark's university system is seen as entwined, in some instances, with an intellectual challenge to existing standards; however, for the most part the building of new institutions kept the intellectual standards of the traditional university. (SW)

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DANISH HIGHER EDUCATION: EXPANSION, CRISIS AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

by

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YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP

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I

A Crisis in Danish Higher Education?

Over the last twenty years, and particularly in the decade since 1968, the system of higher education in Denmark has undergone a dramatic expansion and change. It has expanded from a system serving an elite portion of Danish society to one approaching the scale of mass higher education. It has also changed from a system in which all decision-making was controlled by professors or chairholders to one in which decision-making has been spread to all ranks of faculty, students, and even technical personnel.

The pattern of change in Denmark has been similar to that in other European countries. Expanded economic prosperity in the late 1950's and 1960's sparked a quantitative increase in students, faculty, and new institutions. Student rebellions in 1968 led to demands for wider participation in university governance as well as other changes in the institutions' internal structure. As a result of these rebellions, the Parliament passed laws in the early 1970's which ended the exclusive rule of the professors and provided for the new expansion in decision-making power by all faculty, students, and staff. Using their newly created governing power, young Marxist intellectuals, both students and teachers, made repeated attempts in the 1970's to "takeover" the curriculum of certain departments, and in some cases of entire institutions. This Marxist action was coupled with further student strikes. As a result the state acted to intervene in the management of some institutions, and university affairs became a political issue. Though the student strikes have subsided since the spring of 1977, the possibility of further state intervention in the management of universities continues to exist.

Though this pattern is not unique, the changes in Denmark have been

publicized as being more dramatic or traumatic for several reasons:

1) Denmark, unlike some other European countries, had a tradition of orderly and gradual change. Thus the suddenness of change has been difficult to handle.

2) The position of the Danish university and of the Danish professor before 1968 was more "feudal" or "medieval" than in other countries.

3) The degree of democratization or participation brought by the new laws has been greater than in other countries.

What has been the reaction to this expansion and its attendant changes? Before 1968 most Danes, both within the universities and in the general society, viewed the initial expansion of the late 1950's and 1960's as "good." An expansion of higher education would lead not only to a happier but a more prosperous society. An investment in manpower, it was thought, was the wisest thing a small country with few natural resources could do. This seemed particularly important as the nation's economy was not only growing but changing its emphasis from agriculture to industry.

There was an element of euphoria in those days which the Danes now call the "happy" or "golden" sixties. There was also an element of educational idealism at the time. Many Danes wanted to try educational experiments with interdisciplinary studies and other programs which would provide a new variety to what seemed a rather rigid and lengthy university curriculum. Previously a student entered the university to study one subject and could not transfer to another course without starting over. And the traditional first degree or "candidatus" could take 5½ to 7 years to complete. There were also plans for new kinds of institutions to be called "university centers" where the faculties of the traditional Danish university would be

merged with other disciplines (e.g. engineering and business) which had hitherto been offered in separate institutions. The university centers would also offer a new interdisciplinary "basic course" which would allow the student to choose a number of different specialties leading to different careers as he progressed in his education. Thus the "lockstep" of a final choice made at entry would be broken. (See Section II for more detail on degrees and institutions.)

Since 1968 the reaction to the changes has been different. Not all Danes view the changes in negative terms, but much of the literature written on the post-1968 developments paints a crisis-ridden picture. For the English reader, the best examples can be found in Mogens Blegvad and Steen Leth Jeppesen, "Danish Universities in Transition," in Paul Seabury, ed., Universities in the Western World (New York: The Free Press, 1975), and in more detail in Mogens N. Pedersen, "State and University in Denmark: From Coexistence to Collision Course," in Hans Daalder, ed., Legislators and the University (forthcoming).[1]

Pedersen argues that the old Danish university, if not a perfectly efficient organization, was at least one run by professors who understood the university's primary goals of teaching and research and managed it with those ends in mind. The "reformed" university which emerged from the Parliamentary legislation of the 1970's was one created by legislators who did not understand these peculiar goals and quickly tried to pattern university governance along the broader participatory lines of political society in general. Pedersen states, "...it is not surprising that the Parliament tended to treat the entire case in terms of democratization of a large public institution. No attempts were made to analyze and discuss the probable consequences for the Danish university system in terms of the principal functions

of the university, research and teaching."[2]

These observers note that the changes in the governance structure have not only caused problems in the distribution of power but have also lowered the quality of university work. They claim that too much time is taken in the new student-faculty governing boards thus reducing the time spent on teaching and research. Citing this as well as the demand that more attention be given to "socially relevant" problems, Blegvad and Jeppesen conclude, "All in all there is reason to believe that university research has suffered and that a decline has taken place, at least if the increase in personnel is taken into consideration." They go on to add, "Regarding instruction, there is no doubt that the influence given to the students through the study board arrangement has been exploited. Most teachers would argue that this had led to a deterioration of studies."[3]

In short, these analysts think the changes resulting from the new laws of the 1970's have brought little more than hopeless instability to the Danish system. Pedersen feels that the university has lost much of its autonomy as a result of political mobilization and asks, "Are these related processes reversible, or are they bound to change for good the concept of university?"[4] Blegvad and Jeppesen propose that "former attitudes toward academic studies and their social functions have more or less deliberately been undermined." They even go so far as to state, "Thus understandably, the question has been raised as to whether some things might have taken place which in the long run can cause irreparable harm to the country and to its democratic system of government."[5]

This type of criticism has led many people who have an interest in the study of university systems to see Denmark as an example of a country whose higher education system has "gone wrong." It should thus be studied as an

example of what not to do.

There is, however, another way to look at the Danish situation. Indeed, the dislocations and instabilities observed by the critics have occurred. But are they necessarily signs of a permanent weakening of a system, which if left alone could have continued to operate in its traditional manner? It is also possible to view these dislocations as the natural, even inevitable results of necessary transformations coming from a process which can be best described as "institution-building."

In Denmark it can be seen that the process was particularly confusing for a number of reasons. The traditional Danish university had been so small and simple in organization that the professors had little interest or concern with the activities of the university beyond their own specific fields. Thus they were unable to grasp the need for a more complex institutional structure to handle the problems generated by the system's growth. And they tended to resent and disregard the advice of their few colleagues, whom we may call the "institution-builders," who tried to alert them to the need for change. Professor Mogens Fog, rector of Copenhagen tried to reorganize his university's faculty structure before the 1968 strike, but the majority of professors overwhelmingly rejected his plan. Thus Parliament imposed a new structure on the universities that seemed unable to change themselves. Thus institution-building was initially complicated because there was not a large body of experienced "institution-builders" and because the new structure was imposed by the state. We should note, however, that the Parliament turned to university leaders, particularly Mogens Fog, for advice on the needed institutional changes; it then left the management of the new structure to those inside the university.

Institution-building is a transitional process, not a permanent state of

confusion. It can, if purused with wanton recklessness, result in the collapse of universities. But this is not necessarily the case; stability usually emerges as the cast of institutional characters learn to interact with each other for mutual benefit in a minimal amount of time.

By looking at the Danish system from the standpoint of institution-building, by analyzing the way in which the universities were "built" or "misbuilt" in the period of expansion, we may be able to see the situation in a light different from that described by the critics. This paper will do just that. The information on which it is based was drawn from a series of interviews conducted in Denmark in the fall of 1977.[6] This method makes it difficult to prove that Danish universities are moving in one direction or another. But the range of remarks, both favorable and unfavorable, from participants in the system will, I hope, offer a balance to the current literature on Denmark's system of higher education.

Before delving into the nature of "institution-building" let us first take a look at the basic facts about 1) the organization of higher education in Denmark; 2) the growth of the system; and 3) the nature of the Parliamentary legislation of the 1970's.

II

Organization of the System

The Danish system of higher education, like many other European systems, is divided into three sectors of institutions, all of which are state-supported. Most of these institutions are under the control of the Ministry of Education except for schools of art, architecture, and music which are controlled by the Ministry of Culture. The three sectors are:

1) Universities and university centers: These institutions contain the

faculties of medicine, theology, natural sciences, arts, and social sciences (including law). However, not all of the universities contain all of these faculties. The first degree offered by the faculties is the "candidatus" degree equivalent to the American B.A.-M.A. or B.A. plus first professional degree for a period of study from 5½ to 7 years. Advanced degrees (masters, licentiate, and doctorate) are offered for longer periods of study. University centers may also provide instruction in subjects offered in the institutions listed in categories 2 and 3 below (e.g. engineering, business, teacher training, social welfare). They also differ from the universities in requiring an interdisciplinary "basic course" in the first year. The universities are: 1) Copenhagen, founded in 1479; 2) Aarhus, founded in 1928; and 3) Odense, founded in 1966. The university centers are 1) Roskilde, founded in 1972; and 2) Aalborg, founded in 1974. (Currently there are plans to expand Odense into a university center.)

2) Other institutions of higher education: These institutions offer universtiy-level training in technical and other specialized disciplines. They include the Danish Technical University, the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, the Academic School of Engineers, the Danish School of Pharmacy, the Danish School of Educational Studies, two dental colleges, and two schools of business administration. The institutions offer degrees from the candidatus to the doctorate for periods of study equivalent to the universities.

3) Institutions of further education, sometimes referred to as other "theoretical education." These include teacher training colleges, library schools, social work schools, and lesser technical and commercial schools. These institutions offer post-secondary instruction for a period of two-four years.

Student Expansion

Over the last two decades the Danish system has experienced a rapid growth in student numbers. The annual intake for all three sectors has risen from 8,300 students (13% of the 19-year old cohort) in 1960 to 20,000 (27% of the same cohort group) in 1975. The universities and university centers (group 1) have grown proportionally faster than the other institutions. If all categories are given a 1960 index number of 100, their 1975 numbers are respectively: Universities, 450; other institutions of higher education, 208; and institutions of further education, 154. Total entry in the university sector alone rose from 2200 in 1960 to 9900 in 1975; total enrollment for the university sector in the same period rose from 7,900 to 49,000.[7] The universities grew more rapidly than the other sectors, among other reasons, because there was no restricted admission until 1977; entry was automatic upon passing the student examination of the Danish gymnasium (upper secondary school). Some institutions in the other two groups, particularly the teacher training colleges, established restricted admissions earlier. The entire system was placed under restricted admission in 1977, and it is hoped that the annual entry will stabilize at 20,000 a year with a little less than half of this entry designated for the university sector. This figure is based on the availability of jobs which utilize the skills of graduates. Traditionally a degree from a Danish institution of higher education has been closely linked with professional entry into the civil service or school teaching.

Faculty Growth

The expansion in the size of the teaching staff has been as dramatic as the increase in student numbers. In the university sector the total number of full-time teachers rose from 658 in 1961-62 to 1797 in 1967-68 (the year

in which the student rebellion occurred) to 3147 in 1975-76. While the total full-time staff increased by 173% between 1961 and 1967 and by 378% between 1961 and 1975, the number of chairholders did not expand proportionally. In 1961-62 there were 234 professors in the university sector; in 1967-68 the figure rose to 337 and then to 447 in 1975-76. This represented an increase of only 44% in the 1961-67 period and 91% for the 1961-75 time span. The ratio of professors to non-professors (junior faculty) dropped from 1:1.8 in 1961 to 1:4.3 in 1967 to 1:6 in 1975. Thus the quantitative growth in the faculty also resulted in a qualitative change in faculty hierarchy.[8] As the universities grew it became less likely that any particular junior faculty member could expect to be promoted to a chair and consequently have any hand in university governance. The expansion of the system undercut the certainty of a career path which had been a normal expectation in the traditional university.

Legislation Affecting University Governance

Prior to 1970 each institution of higher education was governed by its own set of statutes; there were no system-wide statutes or "university acts" to govern the institutions. In the university sector all governing power was held by the professors. Within each university the professors grouped themselves by faculty and every professor was ex-officio a member of his faculty council. For overall supervision of the university, the professors meeting together elected from among themselves a rector and pro-rector (deputy). The faculty councils then elected from among themselves a designated number of people to sit on the supreme governing board or Konsistorium. The Konsistorium also included ex-officio the deans of the faculties (professors) and one non-professor called the Kurator who was appointed by the

Ministry of Education to handle the financial affairs.

The actual decision-making power was even more informal than this seemingly simple structure. Though the professors met together in the Konsistorium and Faculty Councils, each professor made most of the decisions relating to his field on his own. There were no departmental groupings of the professorial chairs within the faculties. The professor set the curriculum and the examinations, decided what research he would pursue, chose his successor to the chair, and often granted the degree. There were few "institutional" decisions to be made beyond the specialty of the chair. Financial affairs were left to the ministry's appointed Kurator. Traditionally, the system was small enough to be run in this simple, personal manner. (See Chart A.)

The Management of Universities Act of 1970 provided a uniform governing structure for the three existing universities; no other institutions were affected. This act not only ended the exclusive rule of the professors, but it also took away their ex-officio membership on the faculty councils. The professors now had to share their decision-making power with all teaching ranks and students. And some professors would be left without any decision-making power at all. The prerogatives of the professorial chair were also weakened by the organization of departments below the faculty level.

By the 1970 Act the faculty councils acting together elected a rector and pro-rector from among the professors. On the surface this did not seem such a break with the past, but the membership of the faculty councils as well as of the Konsistorium was drastically altered. The faculty councils now contained a designated number of members which included 2/3 teachers of any rank elected by the teachers and 1/3 students elected by the students. The university-wide Konsistorium had the same 2:1 teacher-student ratio.

Each group elected its own representatives to the Konsistorium on a university-wide basis.

Below the faculty level departments with overall supervision for teaching and research were organized for different subject fields. Decision-making at the departmental level was split between different boards for administration/research and for teaching. A departmental council with 2:1 teacher-student representation handled day to day administration including the appointment of full-time teachers and the allocation of funds. Curricular and instructional matters at the departmental level were handled by departmental "study boards" with a parity representation of 1/2 teachers and 1/2 students. The departmental council delegated research activities to various "institutes" within the department. Each institute was governed by an "institute council" with 2:1 teacher-student representation.

For clarity let us note that the "institute" (e.g. English institute, Nordic institute, etc.) was the basic building block in this new structure. It was in the institute that a full-time teacher of any rank would have an appointment. Thus the institute provided the staff for both teaching and research. By statute all full-time teachers devoted 50% of their time to teaching, 40% to research, and 10% to administration. Thus the "institute council" made policy on its members research activities while the "departmental study board" and its sub-boards made decisions on the curricular and instructional duties of an institute member. The "departmental council" made the overall appointments to the institutes and allocated research funds among them. It also allocated funds to the "departmental study board" for the employment of part-time teachers. (See Chart B.)

The Management of Institutions of Higher Education Act of 1973 expanded the coverage of the 1970 Act and broadened the degree of participation in

university decision-making. It also refined certain parts of the new structure created in 1970.

The 1973 act covered not only the universities and the newly created university centers, but also all other institutions of higher education (i.e., all institutions in categories 1 and 2). This uniform law, we might say, created a Danish "system" of higher education. The principal feature of the act was the inclusion of technical and administrative personnel (TAP) in all decision-making bodies, except the study boards (i.e., Konsistorium, faculty councils, departmental councils, and institute councils). Both teachers and students relinquished a degree of representation to these new participants. The old split of 2/3 teachers to 1/3 students was changed to 1/2 teachers to 1/4 students to 1/4 TAP — a ratio of 2:1:1. Again, each class of representatives was elected from its own group.

The structural refinements of the 1973 Act concerned the election of the rector and a change in the study boards. By the new act the rector was now to be chosen from among all tenured faculty, not merely from the professors. And he was to be elected by the members of the faculty councils along with the members of the Konsistorium who did not sit on those councils. To provide more overall co-ordination of the separate departmental study boards, a central board for each faculty with the power to override decisions of the departmental study boards was added to the structure. (See Chart C.)

In summary the major changes wrought by these two acts were:

1) The end of the exclusive rule of the professors and of the ex-officio membership of every professor on a faculty council.

2) The creation of departments and institutes below the faculty level and hence the end of the traditional prerogatives of the professorial chair.

3) The "integration of the teachers."[9] All teachers, tenured and untenured, full-time and part-time, were now equal in their ability both to be elected to decision-making bodies and to vote for those positions. Only the posts of rector and pro-rector were restricted to tenured faculty.

4) Student participation on all decision-making bodies and the right of students to elect those members.

5) Representation of technical and administrative personnel on all decision-making bodies except the study boards.

6) The creation of a "bifurcated government"[9] in which decision-making was divided between administration/research and teaching and assigned to separate boards. Some people remark that this is the feature most peculiar to the Danish system. This accounts for what may seem to be the "floating" quality of the study boards in organizational charts B and C.

7) The creation of a "system" or a uniform management structure for all institutions of higher education.

With these facts in mind let us now turn to phenomenon of institution-building and attempt to trace its effects and ramifications for the Danish system.

III

Institution Building: A Definition

To understand the effects of "institution building" in Denmark, it would be best to begin with a definition of "institution" in the academic context. An "institution" is not necessarily synonomous with a "university."

Simply stated, an institution is an organization in which individuals congregate both to pursue personal goals and to pursue broader group interests or "institutional goals." The latter are usually complementary

with the personal goals but unobtainable without group effort -- hence the inducement to congregate. However, institutional and personal goals may conflict at times and the individual may be forced to sacrifice some of his personal autonomy. This is an inherent part of the institutional structure, not a malfunction of it.

As the achievement of institutional goals is beyond the scope of one person, the structure of the organization will be characterized by any number of groupings or arrangements of people. Thus relationships--often a myriad of different relationships--will be established among the members of the institution. A "complex" structure will contain a greater number of groupings and relationships than a "simple" one. However, it should be noted that a simple institution may well contain as many people and may well generate as much output as a complex institution. But its activities will be conducted more through individual than group actions.

Each person within an institution plays two roles--he pursues his own goals and those of the institution. The precise blend of these roles is not the same in every person. Consequently there will be varying degrees of "institutional loyalty" among the members of the organization. Despite these variations, the dual role must be present in our definition of "institution." It is possible to imagine a situation in which a professor says, "My personal goals are identical to the university's goals and the university's goals are achieved by the pursuit of my own interests." If such an individual admits no group interests (i.e. denies the existence of dual roles), he is not really part of an "institution." His university might better be described as a "holding company" or an "umbrella organization." It has no goals beyond the sum of the personal interests of its members.

To refine our definition of "institution" we should also note that most members of academic institutions view self-governance or autonomy as a primary "institutional goal." Though an academic institution may have external visitors or trustees who represent society at large, it usually attempts to assert the right to make as many decisions as possible from a vote of its internal members. As the members of the institution have congregated to pursue certain peculiar or special interests, they usually believe that decisions should be made by the people who are equipped to understand those peculiar interests (i.e. themselves). To protect this autonomy an institution usually must draw some type of boundary between itself and society at large in order to maintain its sense of peculiarity or distinctiveness and to prevent outsiders from drifting into the decision-making process.

From the above comments on "institutions" we can say that "institution building" involves:

1) Distinguishing institutional from personal goals;
2) Organizing groups and assigning different institutional goals to them;
3) Effecting an efficient procedure for decision-making within each group; and
4) Establishing a boundary or conscious relationship with society at large.

When these conditions are met we can say that the institution is "built" or stable. On the other hand the institution can become instable if its members cannot distinguish institutional from personal goals, and continually try to take decisions out of the groups and pull them back into the personal sphere. Instability will also result if the members fail to achieve an efficient decision-making process. Such instability may well lead to

institutional collapse if its individual members no longer see any of their goals being met and hence "exit" the institution. Collapse can also result if the decision-making process becomes so inefficient that arbitrary authority, particularly state intervention, must be introduced. Then the boundary with society at large disappears, and the self-governing aspect is lost.

With these definitions in mind, let us look at the record of institution building in Denmark. There have been two distinct processes which we must examine separately. The first was the reshaping of the existing or pre-1970 universities at Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense -- and later of other institutions of higher education (e.g. Danish Technical University). The second was the building of two totally new university centers at Roskilde and Aalborg.

Institution Building: Reshaping the Existing Universities

We have already noted that the traditional or pre-1970 university placed nearly all decision-making power in the professorial chair. There was almost no mixture of institutional goals with the personal desires of the professors. This lack of institutional goals was noted over and over again during the interviews. Erik Hansen and Jørn Carlsen, both members of the English Institute at Aarhus, commented that the traditional Danish professor was an Olympian figure with loyalty only to himself. If he did acknowledge a loyalty beyond the chair, it was to a community of scholars representing chairholders in his field at other universities. They noted that though the professor was a prestigious figure in Danish society, he rarely used the power of his position to help shape or direct the expansion of the universities. So while the Danish professor was not a totally

atomized individual, his broader loyalties simply did not include his local university.

If it was difficult to distinguish institutional goals in the traditionaly Danish university, it was even harder to discern the relationship between the universities and Danish society at large. Most members of the public saw the universities as "mystical" entities. The public viewed the universities with awe and deference. There was, for example, no regular newspaper coverage of university affairs; the newspapers felt it was not their role to question the affairs of scholars. Awe also characterized the relationship between the universities and both the politically powerful trade unions and the dominant Social Democratic Party in Parliament.

Added to this awe and deference was the historical fact that the Crown had retained statutory authority over higher education after most governmental powers were transferred to the Parliament in the 19th century. Thus the Parliament had not legislated for the universities before 1970, and had not really discussed the universities before the 1960's. Even the Ministry of Education made little attempt to interfere in or suggest a direction in the affairs of the universities. Some people have seen this deferential or "mystical" relationship between the universities and the press, the political parties, and the government as a positive or beneficial relationship. But it really constituted no relationship at all, and thus left the universities with no institutional experience in drawing and maintaining a firm boundary between themselves and society at large.

At Copenhagen "institutional" loyalty was further weakened or impeded for physical reasons. While we can theorize about an institution being a set of groups or relationships, it is usually necessary for the "institution" to have a physical shape -- a set of buildings with a visible relationship

to each other. But in Copenhagen it was difficult to "find" the university. University buildings were scattered throughout the city and often space was rented in portions of commercial buildings.

Aarhus, however, was better served in this respect with a carefully planned, architecturally homogeneous set of buildings placed together in a university park. And the newest pre-1970 university, Odense, was housed in a connected group of buildings set outside the city.

This simple institutional structure in the old university was not able to handle the increasingly complex concerns placed upon it by the growth in student and teacher size; the Copenhagen student strike of 1968 was the final evidence of this. As the professors were unable to adopt a more complex institutional structure on their own, Parliament imposed a "new" institution on them. It is not our purpose here to argue whether the Parliament acted properly or rationally. The seminal fact is that it acted. What is important to analyze is whether the members of the institutions have been able to complete the building of the new structures given them. Have the institutions moved toward stability -- or toward instability and collapse as some of their critics have suggested?

First, let us ask to what extent the curriculum of the universities has been diluted by student demands or forced into a radical or Marxist mold because of the study boards. Almost everyone interviewed could cite an example of an institute or department which had been radicalized. Most noted, however, that a radical movement was usually contained within an institute; it did not spread along the pattern of an "academic domino theory" to other institutes. Most people were unable to pinpoint why instability occured in one institute and not in another. The usual response was simply, "I suppose we were lucky," or "The people in our institute were more cohesive."

Some people noted that the nature of the subject matter and the persuasion of the students who chose certain subjects influenced whether or not the traditional curriculum was challenged on a study board. Peter Lawaetz, rector of the Danish Technical University, noted in conversation (and later in a paper presented to the OECD in May 1978) that the engineering curriculum remained stable among other reasons because engineers seem to be more "rational than most, probably due to initial interest, type of subjects to be studied, and a strong tradition for organized studies."[10] Other factors which people cited as limiting curricular change were the professional requirements for employment coming from a particular field of study, the degree of ideological or culturally-based content within a subject, and the availability of funds to implement new demands. In general the fields of medicine, engineering, and natural sciences remained stable while the humanities and social sciences -- particularly sociology, political science, history, history of ideas, and languages -- were more subject to curricular instability.

But even the "instable" disciplines have been subject to differing reactions at different universities -- some being radicalized and others retaining the traditional curriculum. The usual explanation for this dilemma was one of personality; a particular institute contained a member, usually a younger teacher, who wanted to force his ideas on others. He succeeded or failed depending on how many personal followers he had.

In short, it appeared that each institute developed a cellular structure of its own depending on the academic content of the subject field and the personality of its members. Since the voting members on all boards were drawn from the teachers and students within a subject field, it was not possible for radical forces from one institute to "invade" another. Many people said that though they once feared the radical disease would spread, they no longer were

concerned that instability in one institute would spread throughout the university.

Despite this relative optimism on the stability of curricular standards, there was one fear of instability which was frequently voiced. This stemmed from that very element of personality which in some cases formed protective barriers between institutes. Most teachers observed that within a study board the students would vote as a bloc while the teachers would act in a more atomized fashion. Thus there was the danger that one charismatic teacher could force his ideas on the board by winning the bloc vote of the students. Nearly everyone who advocated a revision of the study boards to a 2:1 teacher-student ratio cited not a fear of the students, but a need to control their own faculty mavericks. Some extended this comment to note that though student strikes were the original form of protest against the traditional university, the students were more led by certain teachers than doing any leading on their own.

Another change of instability leveled by the critics has been the impossibility of achieving an efficient decision-making process. The meetings of the various boards, they claim, inevitably takes too much time. And the bloc voting of the students in contrast to faculty fragmentation undercuts the principle of equal representation. Professor Erling Olsen, former rector of Roskilde and now a member of Parliament, noted that these boards invariably attract the wrong kind of people -- those who have lost interest in scholarship, crusaders, and the exceptionally loyal. Thus the "normal" people who do the work of the university are not represented on the boards.

Nearly everyone interviewed noted all of the above criticisms -- excessive time, bloc-voting, and the presence of zealots. But many also observed that decision-making was a process -- to some extent a political process --

which had to be learned and perfected. The most articulate spokesman in this regard was the rector of Copenhagen, Professor Morten Lange.

Lange, a natural scientist, former member of Parliament and one-time leader of the Socialist People's Party, emphasized that group decision-making was something very new to the Danish university. In the traditional era there were few if any meetings because the professors made most of the decisions on their own. Lange said it would take two to three years to train more and more teachers in the art of university governance. It would take time for most to learn, "There is no statute which says a meeting must be long." The "long meeting," according to Lange, is a particular political form used to wear down the opposition and obtain a certain vote. It would take time to learn when, and when not, to use it.

Lange went on to note that efficient internal governance was the only wasy to establish that necessary boundary between the university and society at large. If the university indicated that it could not make its own decisions, regulation by the ministry of education would be imminent. Lange felt there was no overwhelming desire on the part of the state to interfere with the universities as long as they could run themselves. Only the intervention of "very foolish political forces," he said, could change that situation.

At Aarhus, Hansen and Carlsen made similar observations about learning the skills of decision-making. Carlsen noted that as he sat on the boards he became more and more impressed with how able the students were becoming. To him the ideas and thought of those on the boards were sharpened. Hansen, who was not a member of his institute's study board, commented that when he proposed a new course to the board, he was amazed at how able the members were in questioning him. Both men at Aarhus though the experience gained on these boards was a vaulable addition to their university. And they believed

that the curriculum had been broadened and improved as a result. Their only hesitation was that the curriculum might now be too broad.

Peter Lawaetz of the Danish Technical University echoed this feeling that there has been a positive "spin-off" effect from the participatory boards. "More people," the rector noted in his paper to the OECD, "have had a purpose in talking to each other with the result that the institutes within each department are now working closer together... Thus although much time is spent in meetings and preparations having little direct connection with the daily tasks of the individual, I am convinced that the longer term effects will show that the time has not been wasted."[11]

It was the impression of the author that by the fall of 1977 the traditional universities which were reshaped by the Acts of 1970 and 1973 were moving in the direction of stability. Whereas some institutes had been radicalized, this was by no means a general condition. While there were some fears expressed over potential instability in the governing boards, particularly in the study boards, there was a greater appreciation of the gains which had been made in effecting the new decision-making process. I talked with a few scholars who had exited their universities or were contemplating doing so. But the majority of the people interviewed indicated that few scholars felt forced to leave their universities -- either because of intellectual harassment or excessive time spent on administration. Increasing institutional stability mixed with a lingering fear that "foolishness" on the part of a few students or politicians might upset the new order was the dominant opinion expressed to the author in the interviews.

It is, of course, entirely possible that this was the impression that the people I interviewed wanted to give. This is a hazard of the interview process. But those people who did not like the changes were quick to reveal

their disappointment, even their bitterness. And those who were more positive about the new structure did not try to discount these criticisms; they freely acknowledged the opinions of those who were disappointed but differed with their assessment of the direction of change.

However, there was to the author a striking difference between those who were positive and those who were disappointed -- and the difference centered on the phenomenon of institution-building. Institution-building is an organizational, not an intellectual, process. Those who distinguished this difference and who recognized that their Danish universities were undergoing this kind of change tended to be positive about the future. Having accommodated themselves to the change in organization, they found that their intellectual activities could go on without serious interruption. These people felt they were now part of a new organization, an institution, which had never existed before. To them this was an addition to their scholarly life -- particularly in terms of collegiality within the university. And a part of this collegiality now stemmed from a pride in building these new institutions which were originally imposed upon them by the Parliament.

Those who complained most about a deterioration of intellectual quality seemed unable or unwilling to make this intellectual-organizational distinction. They had not accommodated themselves to the new institutions, and to some extent they thought it inappropriate to do so. Sitting on boards with students was not something a scholar did. These people felt very little attachment to a particular university; loyalty was placed elsewhere. They did not comment so much on the problems of institution-building as on the inappropriateness of it. To them scholarly achievement was still equated with the traditional professor-run university.

Stability in the traditional universities, however, is only half of the

picture. It has been instability in the first new university center at Roskilde that has attracted the concern of the critics more than the reshaping of the traditional universities. Let us now turn to the story of two university centers, and see if the problems there have stemmed from inherent dangers in participatory governance or from early mistakes in institution-building.

Institution-Building: Two University Centers--Roskilde and Aalborg

Roskilde University Center, opened in 1972, has been the cause celebre of Danish higher education. Located in a pastoral setting 20 miles outside of Copenhagen, the new center was primarily designed to relieve the overcrowding at Copenhagen University. But it was also to be a showcase for all the idealistic new ideas in higher education which were planned in the 1960's. The curriculum, beginning with three basic introductory courses in the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences, was "project-oriented;" students would learn by investigating experiences in the real world and then arrive at theory. The buildings of the new center were arranged in a "house-plan" so that all students and teachers working on a particular project would be grouped together. Thus the institute structure was not present.

The plans for Roskilde had originally been supported in Parliament by people representing the full spectrum of political viewpoints. Yet within a year of its opening, the new university became a political issue of the right versus the left. What went wrong at Roskilde?

To most observers it appeared that the broad, pluralistic, interdisciplinary curriculum was captured by the left. Moderate and conservative faculty, as well as students, soon exited the university. Erling Olsen, the first rector initially appointed by the Parliament to head Roskilde, was quickly voted out of power because he was not in agreement with all the demands

of the left. The new institution soon attracted the attention of the media, and the "projects" in the new curriculum were often ridiculed and criticized. "They study Mickey Mouse at Roskilde," became a typical public comment. And at Roskilde the problems seemed to be unversity-wide rather than isolated in a certain cell or institute.

In the December 1973 elections, criticism of Roskilde became a campaign issue pushed by the right-wing parties -- particularly the new Progressive Party. These parties scroed significant victories which not only altered the previous balance in the Danish party system but also propelled Roskilde into extended Parliamentary debate. There the right wing parties called for state intervention to reverse the trends at Roskilde; some called for closing the university. To placate the demands of the right, the Social Democratic government intervened in the management of Roskilde in 1975. The act of 1973 was suspended at the center and a rektorat of three external persons (sometimes referred to as the three dictators) was appointed by the ministry and given a veto power over the decisions of the governing boards as well as the right to initiate policy on its own. Several decisions of this rektorat prompted further student strikes and demonstrations which in some cases spread to other universities. These demonstrations kept Roskilde firmly entrenched in Parliamentary deliberations.

As the Roskilde issue moved into politics, it seemed to some observers that the problems there were not exceptional but simply an exaggerated version of the problems affecting all Danish universities. As a natural corollary all universities might soon be subject to Parliamentary debate and political action. But is Roskilde just an extreme example of the general problems overtaking Danish higher education? Or is it dramatically atypical? Let us have a look at the way in which it was built.

Mogens Pedersen suggests that Roskilde's problems originated because of a lack of initial planning. "No one in the Folketing (Parliament)," he notes, "discussed in depth the possible meanings of the term 'university center,' neither did a discussion take place at any occasion of the organizational and educational principles which were to characterize the center."[12]

Possibly more thorough planning would have helped Roskilde. But conversations with some of the men who helped to shape the initial plans for the center, principally Professors Morten Lange and Erling Olsen, indicated that the problems stemmed from assumptions about the building of the institution which later proved to be unrealistic. All the discussion in the world might not have changed these assumptions in advance.

First, it was assumed that a fairly representative sample of students would want to leave overcrowded Copenhagen and come to pastoral, suburban Roskilde. But Morten Lange noted that Roskilde failed to attract a cross-section of Copenhagen students. Too much of the student culture proved to be entwined in the city itself -- the availability of inexpensive housing, the variety of places for eating and social gathering, part-time employment, and cultural opportunities revolving around opera, theater, and even the availability of motion pictures. Lange went on to add that it would have been impossible for the new center to match the academic facilities at Copenhagen from the beginning. Thus most students preferred over-crowded Copenhagen. Those who did come to Roskilde were motivated by a high interest in the experimental programs -- particularly in the social sciences. As it turned out, those students most interested in an experimental social science curriculum tended to have a leftist political philosophy. The more conservative students preferred the traditional curriculum and stayed in Copenhagen. Thus from the beginning Roskilde's student body was unrepresentative of Danish society, even of Danish university students, at large.

The faculty which assembled soon proved equally unrepresentative. Though the idea of a university center initially attracted the interest of many people, it proved difficult -- if not impossible -- to recruit older and more established faculty to fill the highest ranks of teaching -- particularly the professorships. Thus the most talented and politically able teachers were the younger faculty -- many of whom were quite anxious to promote their own ideas. Like the students, the young teachers were distinctive for their leftist political philosophy. Ambitious young teachers with more conservative viewpoints preferred to advance their careers in more traditional ways at the older universities.

Assumptions about the development of the new curriculum also caused problems. Many people who had initially promoted the basic course had envisioned an interdisciplinary program combining political science, economics and sociology -- not unlike the programs at some American universities. But there was no norm for this within the Danish system. Hence there was nothing which could be copied at Roskilde. Though the curriculum was new, the faculty spent little time planning it. In fact, the bulk of the faculty did not assemble at Roskilde until a few days before it opened. Though this may sound disastrous in hindsight, there was a certain logic to this lack of planning at the time. Many thought the very newness of the curriculum made advance planning impossible. Some thought it wouldbe best to let the curriculum shape itself in practice. In this self-shaping process the ambitious leftists pushed their own ideas. The moderates soon found themselves not only outnumbered but without any traditional curricular norms to offer as alternatives. This soon triggered their exit as well as that of moderate students. There was no need to stay at Roskilde with Copenhagen so near. And without any previous achievements to preserve at the new institution, there was little

to lose by leaving. Thus the faculty and students at Roskilde became more and more unrepresentative as time went on. One moderate person who did have an interest in maintaining stability at Roskilde was Erling Olsen, the first rector. Olsen thought that the newness of both the faculty and the curriculum would preserve his position. Since the faculty had not had time to work out a decision-making process, he assumed they would confirm his initial appointment, elect him rector and follow his lead in shaping the interdisciplinary curriculum.. Again, this was an incorrect assumption. As we have noted, the leftists immediately made demands on the moderate rector; when he would not meet these requests he was voted out of the rectorship. While Olsen retained his professorship at Roskilde, he, like others, soon returned to Copenhagen to serve as a member of Parliament. Possibly his treatment at Roskilde explains his criticism of the kind of people who sit on university boards.

Roskilde was never able to achieve the features of a stable institution. Its institutional goals were unclear from the beginning, and its members were unable to effect a decision-making process which could sustain the loyalty of a broad spectrum of participants. Thus moderates exited the institution. Even more, the leftists, who may well have shaped the institution to suit their goals, failed to draw the necessary boundary between the institution and society at large which is necessary to maintain autonomy. Their leftist ideology so challenged the values of the society which had first established the institution, that the society could no longer allow it autonomy. Thus on top of the institutional collapse coming from the exit of its members came the intervention of the state.

The institutional instability at Roskilde is real. Few could pretend that its critics have overstated their case. I have suggested that much of this institutional instability has resulted from the way in which the institution

was built rather than from any inherent flaw in the concept of a university center or in the process of participatory governance. To expand this argument let us look at the story of the second university center opened at Aalborg in 1974.

While Roskilde was planned to serve the overflow students from Copenhagen, Aalborg was to be the first university-level institution serving the region of northern Jutland and the city of Aalborg some 150 miles from Copenhagen. Aalborg, a bustling commercial city of 100,000 people. had long wanted a university to elevate the intellectual standards of its region which traditionally lagged behind Copenhagen and Aarhus in educational statistics.

Though Aalborg desired a university, it had not shown any particular interest in having a "university center" with its experimental curriculum. By the early 1970's when the Parliament decided to build a university at Aalborg, the "university center' idea was so popular that the planners decided to give Aalborg this kind of institution or nothing at all. There were some existing institutions below the university level in Aalborg which included a School of Economics and Business, a School of Social Work and a Teknika or lower engineering school. Each of these schools was absorbed in the university center where they joined new programs in the arts and social sciences. Each program, old or new, was to be taught with the introductory "basic course" and the project-oriented curriculum.

Merging the existing institutions into the center required a number of changes to bring these schools up to university level. In some cases a 3½ year curriculum was expanded to a 5½ year "candidatus" program. Also the existing faculties were requires to engage in research; they had not previously done this. In addition the schools had to adjust to the participatory form of university governance provided by the Act of 1973.

So on the one hand Aalborg contained initial elements of potential stability which Roskilde did not possess. It would be the only university in the area thus making it difficult for students to exit to another nearby institution. It was built upon existing schools and faculties who could adapt their known curriculum to new methods of teaching; they did not have to design an entirely new program. And Aalborg, unlike Roskilde, retained the institute as its organizational building-block; it did not adopt the house plan.

Despite these elements of stability, one could also have predicted severe instability from the beginning. Few people were enthusiastic about forming a "university center" and the existing institutions might have spent most of their time and energy resisting their merger into the center. As time went on, further signs of instability appeared at Aalborg. It proved difficult to attract new faculty members -- particularly at the professor level. Sven Caspersen, rector of Aalborg, noted that professors in the older universities viewed Aalborg as "Siberia". Some of those who did come left their families in Copenhagen. Many feared their wives could not find work outside the metropolis or that the would lose their opportunities for advising and consulting. The reluctance of Danes to come to Aalborg was partially offset by a number of Swedes who came from Göteborg to staff the new university. Such a "foreign invasion" could have been an unsettling force in building an institution which had long been sought to lift the pride of Jutland.

Thus from the beginning, it one had carefully analyzed the situation at Aalborg and thought of all the possible problems which might confront institution-building, Aalborg might have looked as potentially disastrous as Roskilde. But what has been the outcome?

In the spring of 1977 the students at Aalborg, along with those in the other Danish universities, participated in a strike to show support for their

peers at Roskilde. Other than that Aalborg has not had an disturbances peculiar to its own campus. If we look at student entry figures for Aalborg in the fall of 1977 we find that of the 1,050 places available, 728 were filled; out of a total of 1,304 applicants who listed Aalborg as a possible university choice, 587 or 45% listed it as their first choice. While the institution has yet to attract as many students as it was planned for, the 45% first-choice figure compares favorably with similar figures of 49% at Copenhagen, 48% at Aarhus and 42% at Odense. At Roskilde only 30% of its total applicants listed the institution as their first choice.[13] Aalborg has not suffered the lack of demand by students which its university center twin has faced. And at Aalborg there has been no attempt to suspend the autonomous operation of the university by state intervention.

Why has Aalborg fared better than Roskilde? The people I talked with at Aalborg were quite conscious of the difference between their center and Roskilde. They proposed a number of reasons to explain Aalborg's stability in light of Roskilde's collapse.

1) The mix of students and faculty was more representative of society at large than at Roskilde. Rector Sven Caspersen noted that there were different political persuasions in the different subjects. Left-wing students were in the ascent in the humanities and social sciences, right-wing students in the technical subjects, and a pluralistic mix in economics.

2) The existing faculty provided an element of stability and its transition to university status was carefully handled. Damsgaard Mikkelsen, former rector of the Danish Engineering Academy which was integrated into the center, emphasized that this transition was not an easy task. He noted that all teachers in the old academy were guaranteed job status and salary security in the transfer. Thus no one was made to feel "second-rate" in the new institution.

3) The initial lack of enthusiasm for the experimental program allowed people to become interested in some of its aspects in a gradual way. The possibility of forming interdisciplinary groups has gradually caused some new teachers to stay at Aalborg. Mikkelsen noted that many of his colleagues have become more and more interested in the fact that Aalborg is the only place in Scandinavia where engineering is taught in conjunction with other university studies. He went on to add that care has been taken to integrate the entire faculty into the new curriculum. Everyone is urged to teach the basic course in rotation to keep the faculty from splitting into those who teach the basic course and those who teach the traditional courses. At Roskilde the experimental curriculum was such an all-consuming passion from the outset that moderates quickly left. At Aalborg people of different persuasions have had time to fuse together behind a new system.

4) Aalborg was quite conscious of the example of Roskilde. As the second "university center" it feared that many people saw it as the twin to Roskilde. As a result there was a strong impetus among its members to learn how to co-operate. Mikkelsen noted that the specter of state intervention was strong. At meetings people would emphasize the need to compromise and make decisions in order to prevent state intervention. Most people agreed that any decisions made by the state could not be as good as those they could make themselves. They clearly and carefully drew the institutional boundary between themselves and society at large.

5) Finally, the desire to have a university in North Jutland was so strong that people were willing to make concessions and adaptations to keep it; they were willing to accept both the fusion of institutions and the experimental curriculum. This overriding institutional goal thus helped to reduce the potential conflict of personal ideological goals which so wracked

Roskilde. And it seemed to the author that by the fall of 1977 the "distinctiveness" of the university center was reinforcing this institutional loyalty. Aalborg was now in possession of a new kind of university; it was not merely a smaller and less prestigious version of Copenhagen.

So two "university centers" opened at two different locations two years apart have had strikingly different histories. One became a cause celebre in higher education and politics. The other achieved stability and may well be one of the first distinctively new and successful academic institutions in Scandinavia. In hindsight we can clearly see that each center was built in a different way. In the end the Aalborg center clearly had more in-built elements of institutional stability. But with foresight could this have been predicted? After all, the plan for a university center at Aalborg was forced on a somewhat reluctant audience whereas it was initially embraced by enthuasiasts at Roskilde. It may not be possible to answer this question. But it was the impression of this interviewer that institution building in Denmark was such a new process that no amount of initial planning and thought would have changed the course of events. People learned how to co-operate or how not co co-operate as the institutions developed. It is indeed possible to learn from the mistakes of the past as Aalborg did from Roskilde. But there must first be a history of mistakes. It may well be the case that in building new organizations the process must be repeated a number of times before any meaningful lessons can be learned. Possibly the most important legacy of the story of Roskilde and Aalborg is the fact that there were two of them.

IV

Conclusion: The Need for an Organizational View

From Copenhagen to Aalborg, our story has now come full circle. Is there a crsis in Danish higher education? Was there a crisis? Are the universities headed for collapse or serious dysfunction because of excessive state intervention, loss of autonomy, and deterioration of academic quality in the name of participatory democracy? This author has made the argument that this is clearly not the case. Instead, the universities have undergone a transitional period of organizational change or institution-building which was particularly confusing because such change was so new to the country and because there were few if any norms to serve as guides. The Danish universities are now moving in the direction of stability, not toward collapse.

In coming to these conclusions I have not tried to dismiss the charges of the critics. Instead I have noted aspects which they did not observe or emphasize. Most important, I believe, was their failure to see that the system of higher education was more involved in organizational change than in intellectual challenge. Also I think they failed to grasp the fact the the traditional university was not a viable organization despite its high intellectual standards.

It was my observation as enforced by the interviews that the critics' lack of an organizational perspective caused the following aspects to be underemphasized or neglected:

1) The driving force for change came more from young faculty, both moderate and radical, than from students. The young faculty were the people who had the most to win from the changes, and they would also have the most to lose if institutions did not eventually move back toward stability. Their future

careers were dependent on this.

2) A widespread dissatisfaction with the position of the professor in the traditional university existed among many younger faculty. Many moderate people told me that the professors had not maintained their intellectual lead in the days of expansion. Hansen and Carlsen noted that the scholarship of the professors, in many instances, was simply not superior to that of younger scholars. Peter Lawaetz hoped that the "role of the professor" as a leader in research could be maintained, but he wondered if any man should hold the position for life. Comments like these indicated to me that in many cases the intellectual authority of the professors in the traditional university had eroded to the point that they could not sustain the deference of younger faculty. It may well prove to be the case that in relinquishing some of their power, the professors kept their position from undergoing further challenges. This is, however, a speculation on my part.

3) The compatibility of intellectual and institutional roles proved appropriate to the lifestyle of many Danish scholars who adapted easily to the new organization. And the previous political experience of such men as Morten Lange also proved a valuable asset in achieving institutional stability.

4) Roskilde, the cause celebre, was almost the exception of instability which proved the rule of stability. Its students and faculty were so unrepresentative of university society at large that their actions should have been seen as those of an exceptional group of people, not of a representative group who behaved in a radical manner because of participatory governance or the new feature of a university center.

5) The scholarly and intellectual ideals of the old Danish university were held by many people who also desired new organizations or who were willing to adapt them. As Peter Lawaetz noted in his OECD paper, "Revolution is

generally a rather slow process in our country, and the transition has been gradual because the new groups in the participation in decision-making have respected the traditional system whenever reasonable."[14]

6) The critics may have overestimated the desire of the Danish Parliament to remain permanently involved in university affairs. The Parliament stepped in initially because the universities failed to govern themselves. A number of people told me that Parliament would now like to avoid further university entanglements if the universities could discipline themselves. The tradition in which Parliament did not discuss university affairs and the fact that Parliament did not spend endless hours making detailed plans for university governance may well prove valuable omens for the future. The Parliament's traditional lack of interest in the universities may well provide a precedent for leaving them alone.[15]

One can easily see how critics might feel that a country which has always had very high intellectual standards could gain nothing new and better from the changes -- and how they might easily fear that there was everything to lose. And this would most readily be taken by those who do not believe that the organization of an institution can require substantial alterations over time to maintain -- not necessarily to raise or lower -- intellectual standards.

This paper holds that dramatic changes in a university system, particularly those coming from physical expansion, can only be understood if the organizational and intellectual aspects are looked at separately. The fact that a university's organization is challenged does not necessarily mean that its intellectual standards are under attack. Nor does the lack of long-range planning by a Parliament indicate its contempt for the intellectual standards of the university.

It was my impression that in Denmark there was an organizational change which was entwined, in some instances, with an intellectual challenge to existing standards. But for the most part the leaders in building new institutions held firmly to the intellectual standards of the traditional university; they now see the new institutions as organizations which can maintain these standards -- and in some cases expand them to new fields of study.

In conclusion I can only stress the need in Denmark and in other countries undergoing similar changes for an organizational perspective. The results of change in other countries may not be the same, but I doubt that they can be accurately assessed without differentiating the intellectual from the organizational view.

Footnotes

1. Pedersen's article can also be found in "Skrifter Fra Institut for Historie og Samfundsvidenskab Odense Universitet," No. 47/1977. All page references refer to this edition. An earlier version appeared as "Interlocking Crises: State and University in Denmark, Wetenschap en Democratie (Amsterdam: Samson Uitgeverij) nr. 3, March 1976.

2. Pedersen, p. 27.

3. Blegvad and Jeppesen, "Danish Universities in Transition," p. 192.

4. Pedersen, p. 64.

5. Blegvad and Jeppesen, p. 181.

6. A list of the people interviewed appears in the appendix. Unless otherwise footnoted, all comments attributed to these people, individually and collectively, came from the October-November 1977 interviews.

7. Student figures and ratios as computed in Levevilkår i Danmark Statistisk oversigt 1976 (Danmarks Statistik, 1976), Table 5.21, p. 124.

8. Faculty figures are taken from Pedersen's appendix, p. 74 and carried forward with figures from Statistisk Arbog, 1977. 1961-62 is chosen as the base year because statistics for "full-time" teachers before that year also included some part-time lecturers. (See Pedersen's note to this effect, p. 74.) The ratios of professor's to non-professors were computed by the author.

9. The terms "integration of teachers" and birfurcated government" are taken from Pedersen, pp. 32-33. For the peculiarity of this bifurcation see Peter Lawaetz, "Experience with Participation and Structural Planning in University Governance, OECD Conference on "University Governance: Policies, Problems and Performance," Paris, May 8-10, 1978.

10. Lawaetz, "Experience with Participation and Structural Planning in University Governance."

11. Ibid.

12. Pedersen, p. 43.

13. Student entry figures for the fall of 1977 compiled as"Optagelse Til de Videregående Uddannelser 1977" were supplied by the Students Information Office, Copenhagen University.

14. Lawaetz, "Experience with Participation..."

15. The author admits a bias here. It has been my observation from historical observation that legislatures often feel a need to create some type of representative governance in public institutions but they do not show a desire for continuing management. See John S. Whitehead, "Dartmouth: A Small College," in The Separation of College and State (New Haven, 1973), pp. 53-88.



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LOCATIONS OF UNIVERSITIES VISITED:

1] Copenhagen University
2] Roskilde University Center
3] Odense University
4] Aarhus University
5] Aalborg University Center
6] Danish Technical University

" A "

TRADITIONAL DANISH UNIVERSITY



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PROFESSORIAL CHAIRS
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" B "

DANISH UNIVERSITY STRUCTURE

"MANAGEMENT OF UNIVERSITIES

ACT OF 1970"

(□ : □ Teacher-Student Ratio)



" C "

DANISH UNIVERSITY STRUCTURE

"MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION ACT"
1973

(□ : □ : □ Teacher:Student:TAP)
RATIO



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